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Policy making in the area of immigration and ethnic affairs relies increasingly on the findings of social
science research. A new "conventional wisdom" is emerging in sociological and economic studies. Its
claim to objectivity is based on the use of a methodology which emphasises the use of sophisticated
statistical methods, especially multiple regression models. The present paper suggests that this
apparently objective approach is actually based on a set of of subjectivist and voluntaristic assumptions
on: the nature of society, the character of the groups being examined, and on the practice and logic of
scientific research.
This type of analysis leads to the reconstitution of the "ethnic group" through the use of dummy variables,
which mask many of the specific structural features of labour migrants. Moreover, the emphasis on
multiple regression models makes it necessary to quantitify the variables to be examined. This involves a
subjective decision by the researcher: either to give a numerical value to something for which there is no
single correct form of quantification, or to exclude it altogether from the analysis.
The approach is based on a human capital model, in which migrants are seen only as economic subjects
in a rational market system. This blocks historical understanding of the way labour relations function in
capitalist societies, in particular of the significance of labour migration, and of the role of segmentation of
the labour market according to ethnciity and gender in class relations.
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Abstract
Policy making in the area of immigration and ethnic affairs relies
increasingly on the findings of social science research. A new
"conventional wisdom" is emerging in sociological and economic studies.
Its claim to objectivity is based on the use of a methodology which
emphasises the use of sophisticated statistical methods, especially
multiple regression models. The present paper suggests that this
apparently objective approach is actually based on a set of of subjectivist
and voluntaristic assumptions on: the nature of society, the character of the
groups being examined, and on the practice and logic of scientific
research.
This type of analysis leads to the reconstitution of the "ethnic group"
through the use of dummy variables, which mask many of the specific
structural features of labour migrants. Moreover, the emphasis on multiple
regression models makes it necessary to quantitify the variables to be
examined. This involves a subjective decision by the researcher: either to
give a numerical value to something for which there is no single correct
form of quantification, or to exclude it altogether from the analysis.
The approach is based on a human capital model, in which migrants are
seen only as economic subjects in a rational market system. This blocks
historical understanding of the way labour relations function in capitalist
societies, in particular of the significance of labour migration, and of the
role of segmentation of the labour market according to ethnciity and
gender in class relations.
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1. Introduction
Chris Hurford, the Australian Minister for Immigration, announced recently
that he had "the objective view for the future" on immigration. In a speech
to a joint Committee for the Economic Development of Australia [CEDA]
and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Forum on Immigration
and the Economy in Sydney on June 11 1986, Hurford claimed that
empirical and historical evidence showed that the medium and longer term
benefits of immigration outweighed the costs. This evidence was drawn
from research carried out over a number of years for CEDA, a business
group concerned with the increased profitability of Australian private
enterprise. The effect of this evidence was to bolster the government's
commitment to expanding immigration and actively recruiting young,
skilled, educated and employable immigrants whose presence would
effectively pay for family reunions, and for the ageing sector of the
population. In addition they would ensure the importation of the skills,
capital, ideas, motivation and education necessary for the "post-industrial
technically sophisticated society ahead...(one which is) increasingly
dependent on financial and commodity markets and prices determined
elsewhere" [Hurford 1986, p. 2-3].
Hurford's "empirical evidence" and the assumptions and methods utilised
by those who constructed it have important consequences for Australian
society. For instance, they formed the basis for a major intervention
recently by Australia in the OECD on immigration and employment
[Withers 1986]. David Lander, Senior Assistant Secretary in the Population
and Research Branch with the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs, sprang to his Minister's defence in face of a recent attack on the
policy by Jock Collins - and used Withers and the CEDA study to help
mount the defence [Collins 1986, Lander 1986].
At its heart the claim to "objectivity", to "scientific status", masks a deep
political commitment to a view of Australia as a free market in which social
mobility is a function of individual endowments and capacities, and in
which the resulting outcomes are rational and "right". This commitment is
rooted in a paradigm that is confused, partly tautological, and ultimately
subjective . This paradigm has manifestations in a range of social
sciences, the most important of which for our purposes are economics and
sociology.
Our testing of this paradigm is based on an awareness that there are (at
least) two competing views of what the relevant questions are to ask of
Australian society. On the one hand, the claims to objective facticity rest on
a proposition that Australia is a liberal democracy with significant but not
endemic inequalities of income, status and power, in which all social facts
are testable by the market, and in which there is broad consensus that
these market outcomes represent rewards for differing personal
endowments.
On the other hand, we claim that Australia is a capitalist democracy, in
which the fundamental dynamic is not individual mobility (which may
indeed occur), but rather the relations of exploitation between classes and
the tensions and patterns they produce. The important questions to ask are
those to do with the way in which Australian capitalism sustains itself by
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the constant replenishment of the pool of new immigrants, who absorb
unemployment, produce high rates of surplus value, and are plastic and
mobile. It is just because the process of settlement allows immigrants over
time to increase their resistance against these processes [e.g. Lever Tracy
1984] that some mobility occurs, thereby requiring ever more new workers
for the machines of capital. Indeed Ross Gittins, Economics Editor of the
Sydney Morning Herald has argued that immigrants should be brought
into the economy because of the jobs they appear to create in industries
that they do not enter - again using the arguments so appreciatively
accepted by the Minister for Immigration [Gittins 1986].
This debate is well known in the social sciences internationally, and little
purpose might be served in repeating it once more, were it not for its
central role in "evidencing" policy positions by government A version of the
debate surfaced momentarily in the pages of Search, the ANZAAS journal,
some three years ago: Kelley and McAllister [1983b], utilising" new causal
theory", an approach based on manipulation of numerical data, proposed
some findings about the nature of class in Australia. They characterised
their "standard quantitative paradigm" as possessing three main elements:
The use of reliable and representative qualitative data, largely from
censuses or large-scale, nationally representative sample surveys;
precise and detailed measurement, notably of class and related
variables; and the use of powerful statistical methods, especially
multiple regression and related general linear-model techniques.
There was a response from Connell, arguing that they exposed their
ignorance of the history of the concept of class, of its use, and of the whole
of Weberian and Marxian European and Australian social research
[Connell 1983]. A short, tough retort followed, claiming that Connell was
trapped in the past and that sociology only became scientific in the mid1950s, having now achieved the status of a "normal" science, after
Thomas Kuhn's useage of the term [Kelley and McAllister 1983c].
The methods of Kelley and McAllister, and colleagues such as Lancaster
Jones [Jones and Kelley 1984] and Evans [Evans1984, Evans and Kelley
1985], have close similarities to those utilised by the economic generators
of Hurford's "objective" view. In this paper we propose to identify the
approaches and findings of a selection of researchers who use
mathematical techniques - the new causal theory in sociology and human
capital theory in economics - to explore the mobility of immigrants in
Australia, and their impact on economic and political processes. We will
then argue that the paradigms contain some unjustifiable assumptions,
and further suggest that even within the terms of paradigms there are
major problems which these approaches fail to resolve.
2. Socio-Economic Attainment
In a paper published in 1984, Kelley and McAllister set out to present "an
empirical analysis of the socio-economic attainments of immigrants in
Australia and the effect of socio-economic position and birthplace on their
voting patterns" (!984a: 388), using data from the 1973 Australian National
University Social Mobility Survey. (Here we shall only look at the findings
on socio-economic attainment, as the issue of political behaviour is dealt
with more thoroughly elsewhere). Analysis was based on ordinary least
squares regression methods, which assume "that relations among
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variables are, to a reasonable approximation, linear and additive" (p. 390).
This involved the quantification of a large number of variables concerning
demographic characteristics, personal and family background, support for
political parties and socio-economic attainment. Now it may be acceptable
to present age, gender, income or years of education as interval numbers
(even that needs consideration, as different types of education may have
effects not simply related to their relative duration), but the quantification of
class position or occupation is problematic. To reduce the class
relationship to the score 1 = large capitalist, 0.5 = small capitalist, 0 =
worker, ignores the complexity of class position and consciousness, and of
the dynamic process of class interaction. The division 1 = supervisor and
0 = worker is also a gross oversimplification. The use of a linear scale for
occupational status is also problematic, as will be discussed in section 6b
below.
Kelley and McAllister find that migrants are not generally disadvantaged,
but that certain "occupational and ethnic groups" are (p. 401): in particular
Mediterranean migrants - and especially to those with relatively good
education. They reject the explanations that this is due to individual
discrimination, or to employers' recruiting an industrial reserve army.
Instead, they assert that:
...immigrants face no disadvantage in competing for jobs or in the
earnings they receive for their labour and that they get the same jobs
and pay as do native born workers with equal skills, knowledge and
experience, and the like. (1984a: 401)
But, they go on, immigrants are generally less productive than the native
born. They lack skills and knowledge. Therefore their lower status and
income is a product of objective market forces. Moreover, education in the
Mediterranean countries is lower in quality than in Australia. That is why
educated people do less well, upon migration, while those doing manual
jobs, where education and language is not needed, are less
disadvantaged. "Hence in the first generation, immigrants will not do as
well economically as natives but in the second they will."
There are some problems about these conclusions: first, they seem to have
little to do with the "powerful statistical methods" but rather to be fairly
speculative. The empirical analysis presented is supposed to give clear
answers to specific questions, but the sweeping conclusions drawn from
the evidence go far beyond these. Secondly, The use of 1973 data, to
assess migrants' position in 1984 is questionable, especially in view of the
intervening recession. It may contribute to the development of of "normal
science", but it is not much use for practical purposes. Thirdly, there is a
circularity in the logic: Mediterranean migrants with education do less well
than they should, therefore there must be something wrong with the
education. But no empirical evidence presented to show that this is the
case, nor to assess its quantitative effect. The same goes for occupational
status and earnings in general: if migrants do less well than the nativeborn, then their productivity must be lower, but no evidence is presented
for this assertion. These problems are not surprising if one looks back at
the introductory remarks, where Kelley and McAllister state their belief that
postwar migration to Australia "appears, at least on the surface, to have
engendered few visible socio-economic problems and almost no political
consequences" (p. 287).
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2. Second Generation Mobility: the other big Issue
The "success" of the migration program has often been argued as lying in
the social mobility of the second generation. Simply put, if the children of
the unskilled and entrapped proletariat can make their way into the middle
class, then the vitality and opportunity that Australia has claimed to offer
the immigrant in return for low social status and heavy hard and dangerous
work will have been realised. To show social mobility, it is enough to
demonstrate that the children of ethnic minorities move to higher social
status or occupational status locations in society than their parents; a
second ingredient seeks to show that they do better than the "ocker"
Australians, controlling for the occupational location of the parents.
Birrell and Seitz [1986] have argued that there is a dominant myth in
Australia that a specifically ethnic underclass exists. The myth depends on
assumptions of second generation ethnic failure which gives, they claim, a
deterministic and essentially false picture of actual achievement. Having
considered studies of Census data and university entrance data, they
propose that ethnicity is not a disadvantaging characteristic, but may
indeed be of considerable advantage vis-a-vis the Anglo-Australian
population. Using figures which examine the occupational status of second
generation males from the 1981 Census, they conclude that the over
representation of such people from ethnic backgrounds in high status
locations confounds those who propose an ethnic underclass.
However they avoid listing data from the same tables on unemployment
rates. Data produced by the National Institute of Labour Studies indicates
that "most [second generation groups] had levels of unemployment not
only in excess of the other Australian-born population but also of their
corresponding first generation populations" [Wood and Hugo 1984, p. 33].
Second generation Greeks may have a higher concentration in
Professional and Technical occupations than children of native born
parents, but they are also over-represented by 65 per cent amongst the
unemployed, while second generation Yugoslavs are overrepresented by
163 per cent among the unemployed.
The issue of mobility and openness of Australian society presents us with
an interesting dilemma. The new causal methodology, and the analyses
based on more simple cross-tabulations as advanced by Birrell and Seitz,
are directed at a particular set of policy positions, namely those which seek
to overcome alleged disadvantages suffered by second generation ethnic
Australians. We would suggest that the internal process of polarisation
within ethnic collectivities is an issue requiring sustained intellectual,
theoretical and empirical effort. But can the approach and the
methodologies adopted by Birrell/ Seitz achieve these goals? We think
not. Quite simply, while Birrell's Monash University may have significant
numbers of sons of Italian and Greek working class fathers, so too do the
dole queues. If both these elements are features of the second generation
experience, it is fairly slipshod to concentrate on only one of the elements
and reach conclusions thereby, which have as their policy goal the
withdrawal from addressing the particular needs of poor children of
"ethnic" origin.
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A more detailed analysis of the 1981 Census data carried out by Ian
Burnley [1986] in the Sydney metropolitan area attempts to address a
similar question regarding an ethnic underclass - using the concept of
structural pluralism as the entry point. Structural pluralism exists in this
version (which is not the same use of the term as in Jean Martin's The
Migrant Presence ), when, over two generations, low or high occupational
status is "inherited" by the children of particular ethnic/religious groups.
The test is the degree of similarity of occupational profiles between
generations, and the residential concentration of ethnic groups over
generations - an approach drawn from the social ecology of the early
twentieth century Chicago school of social science.
Burnley reinforces Birrell/Seitz by showing that
the second generation of those immigrant groups which were more
concentrated in low-socio economic status occupations were less
concentrated in such occupations than those second generations
whose parents' occupational profile compared to that of the host
society....[TJhere was almost full occupational convergence between
groups and the host society in the second generation....[Burnley 1986,
p. 79]
Burnley's findings suggest that ethnic collectivities have quite specific
mobility trajectories in the second generation. But these are not somehow
"ethnic" versus non-ethnic. There are significant differences between
groups which are noted but not theorised. The differences between men
and women are also marked - with the major movement for young women
(compared to their mothers) from labouring/process work to clerical and
technical occupations .
Burnley's contribution to an analysis of why this might be occurring is to
advance Banton's "rational choice" theory of migration [Banton 1983],
wherein " the world is made up of self-interested groups and individuals
each intent on the maximisation of social and economic benefits and the
minimisation of costs..." such that the children of immigrant parents have
been encouraged to "compete as individuals, and such competition,
according to Banton, diminishes racial and ethnic boundaries" [ Burnley
1986, p. 80 -81]. At least the basis of the position is clear, though Burnley
too does not provide unemployment figures to allow us to examine the
opposite end of the ethnic take-off phenomenon. Burnley's data shows
significant movement into clerical, professional and technical occupations
by second generation Greeks, Italians and Yugoslavs in Sydney. But also
significantly, access to managerial and administrative jobs, the potentially
powerful decision making positions in a bureaucratic society, is still fairly
limited and shows, for the most part, the greatest discrepancy between
Ocker and ethnic young workers. [Burnley 1986,73-76].
This question of the second generation has intrigued researchers and
policy analysts alike, much as it did in 1960 when Justice Dovey chaired
the Immigration Advisory Council study of immigrant children, discovering
(without any valid empirical data) that 95% were "assimilating well". Given
the high incidence of youth unemployment, the government sponsored
Institute for Multicultural Affairs carried out a major study of the needs of
ethnic minority and immigrant youth in relation to the labour market
programs offered by the government. The Institute listed a number of the
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key proponents of the new causal theory as consultants on this major study
of migrant youth unemployment, Reducing the Risk [AIMA 1985].
The causal path analysis used produced little in the way of startling insight.
All the factors identified left 91% of the variance unexplained among
Australian born, 92% among the Overseas born with more than five years
residence, and 86 % among Overseas born resident less than five years.
This latter group, particularly those with poor English language skills, were
the group most likely to be unemployed [AIMA1985, p. 65]. No specific
birthplace factors were significant, suggesting that specific discrimination
(i.e. irrational rejection of people because of their ascriptive endowments
or characteristics) was not taking place. The implication was that it was
most likely to be characteristics of the individual who was unemployed
rather than the economic relations in which s/he was enmeshed, that was
the most significant contributor to the state of unemployment.
The conclusions that have been drawn by analysts fascinated by the
success of ethnics, has served to disguise a number of important features
of these trajectories. Inside ethnic communities the range of experience is
vast and cannot be ascribed to ethnicity in any useful way. Moreover, the
failure of the education system to address the learning needs of working
class children, a significant component of whom are of ethnic origin, is a
more pervasive porblem that cannot be swept away by simply labelling the
issue as "mythical" or the problem (whatever it is ) as "solved".
3. IMMIGRANT GENERATION AND INCOME
Chiswick and Miller (1985) use microdata for adult men from the 1981
Australian Census to examine relative incomes of first and second
generation migrants compared with the rest of the male population, and to
assess the determinants of these income levels. The dependent variable in
their estimating equation is the natural logarithm of income, and the
explanatory variables are education, labour market experience,
qualifications, urbanisation, marital status, government employment, and
various factors specific to migrants, including language use, length of
residence, citizenship and education after arrival. The model contains no
information on hours worked or type of employment.
Chiswick and Miller find that the overseas born have 5% lower income
than the Australian born. However, if schooling, labour market experience,
marital status and location are held constant, the incomes of the overseas
born are 7% less than the native born. Increasing duration of residence
has a positive effect on income, but only a small one, so that it would take
50 years of residence to completely close the gap. (p. 545) Education and
work experience bring lower returns for migrants than the native born, and
this disadvantage is particularly marked for those from non-Englishspeaking countries. Chiswick and Miller compare the incomes of different
birthplace groups, and find that there are substantial variations: compared
with migrants from the UK and Eire, Southern Europeans have 18% less
income, Western Europeans have 9% less, Eastern Europeans 12% less,
people from the Middle East 16% less and Asians 8 per cent less. This
important finding is relegated to a footnote (1985: 548).

SAANZ

1 9 8 6 ... Jaku bo w icz/C aslles

page 8

They then go on to look at the incomes of men with migrant parents, in
comparison with those with both parents of Australian birth. They find that
differences in schooling, labour market experience, marital status,
qualifications and government employment are all quite small. The main
difference is that Australians of foreign parentage are more likely to live in
large urban areas. Second generation migrant men are found to have on
average 4% higher incomes than Australians with Australian born parents.
If other variables are held constant, the difference falls to a statistically
insignificant 1%, implying that second generation migrant men are doing
as well as other Australian men. In general they state:
The findings do indicate that the income gap between immigrants,
including recent immigrants, and the native born in 1981 was relatively
small, suggesting that immigrants are still doing relatively well in the
Australian labour market In conclusion, it appears that immigrants in
Australia have adapted fairly well to their new labour market and that
they do not suffer inordinate disadvantages, (p. 552).
These conclusions require a few comments. First, they only make sense, if
one accepts that it is valid to compare the situation of all migrants taken
together with the Australian born. In fact, this comparison is of little value,
as the various birthplace groups are highly diverse, with UK and Eire and
other Northern European migrants having similar situations to the
Australian born, while Southern Europeans and Middle East migrants are
very different. Chiswick and Miller only disaggregate by country of origin at
one place (see above), and the findings there makes nonsense of their
general conclusions. Secondly, Chiswick and Miller may be right to say
that their findings show that male migrants have for the most part done well
in terms of income. But their evidence does not justify their conclusion that
"Immigrants ....do not suffer inordinate disadvantages". They reduce the
complexity of the labour market to just one variable: income. What about
type of work, hours worked, multiple employment, working environment,
job security and unemployment? All these dimensions are simply ignored.
Can one say that migrants are doing well, if they are forced to work long
hours in heavy, unhealthy and insecure jobs to get a reasonable income?
There is a lot of evidence for occupational disadvantage of migrant
workers from Southern Europe and the Middle East countries, and
particularly of women from those countries, who are not covered by
Chiswick and Miller's study at all. Another important issue is the high rates
of unemployment of migrant workers, particularly of the newly arrived, but
of older established groups too. As for the second generation, there is
indeed evidence of upward occupational mobility, and of improvements in
educational level compared with the migrant generation. But as already
mentioned, Census figures also show above-average rates of
unemployment (see Wood and Hugo 1984: 30), and more recent statistics
show that second generation migrant youth has been hard-hit by the
recession of the early eighties (AIMA 1985: 43).
4. Political Behaviour
In a further article, Kelley and McAllister (1983a) turn their attention to the
voting behaviour of migrants in Australia, seeking to analyse changes over
time in the voting habits of three major birthplace groups. Data come from
three large national surveys: the Australian National Political Attitudes
Survey of 1967 and 1979, and the 1973 ANU Social Mobility Survey. The
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method is essentially the same as already described, using ordinary least
squares regression methods. Again, there are variables for family
background and for socio-economic status. This time all capitalists are
scored 1 and workers 0 (what happened to the small capitalists?).
Overseas born persons are divided up into three categories:
Mediterranean, Eastern European and Northern European.
McAllister and Kelley find that there is no "Northern European" vote. The
actual slight propensity of N. Europeans to favour Labor can be explained
by their background and socio-economic status. "It seems that the
irrelevance of ethnicity for Northern Europeans is an enduring aspect of
Australian politics", (p. 102). Eastern Europeans, on the other hand have a
tendency not to vote Labor, which cannot be explained by background or
socio-economic status: "The effect of ethnicity is, however , substantial,
producing a swing of 9% against Labor, on the average". In the case of
Mediterranean migrants, McAllister and Kelley find a sharp change
between 1967 and 1979. In the late sixties, they were less likely to vote
Labor than native-born Australians, later they were more likely to. Again,
this cannot be explained by background or socio-economic status,
"...across the whole period there was a change in the effect of
Mediterranean ethnicity per se: up to the early 1970s, it led to roughly a
10% swing against Labor, while by the late 1970s, it produced a swing of
about the same magnitude in favour of Labor." (P. 103).
The authors then put forward two hypotheses to explain these findings:
first, that length of residence in the country accounts for the change
through its importance in political assimilation, secondly, that the timing of
the immigrant's first vote is decisive (p. 104). The first implies that as
migrants get more assimilated, they become more politically mature, and
therefore vote for conservative parties. The second implies that once
migrants establish a party preference, they are too stupid to change, even
if a different party might represent their interests better.
Once again, a set of dummy variables is created and the computers are set
in motion. In fact, McAllister and Kelley find no evidence to support either
hypothesis and therefore reject them. They then speculate that Eastern
Europeans might vote for conservative parties, because "they are reacting
to the communist regimes in their homelands". And Mediterranean voters
may favour Labor, because they like the policies of multiculturalism, first
introduced in the Whitlam era. (P. 105). No doubt they are right, and there
is a lot of evidence to support this view. But what has this got to do with
"modern sociology" and "powerful statistical methods"? Kelley and
McAllister state wistfully: "Unfortunately the data at hand has no items that
would tap such perceptions directly, so the claim must remain a
speculative but highly plausible explanation". (P. 105).
More serious is the violence Kelley and McAllister do to the concept of
ethnicity. It is meaningless to speak of Northern European, or Eastern
European or Mediterrean ethnicity. How can, say Irish and German culture
and history be subsumed under one category? And if it could, what would
its explanatory value be? Kelley and McAllister's "Mediterranean ethnicity"
includes both Yugoslavs and Turks - extremely varied groups, with
different religions, political cultures and histories. There is no meaningful
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way of lumping them together. Indeed, anyone who knows this field would
refrain from even using the term "Yugoslav ethnicity", for there is no such
thing, but rather a collection of loosely linked national groups (the Serbs,
Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes, etc). To have disaggregated more, would
have given more meaningful results, but it could not have been done on
the basis of Kelley and McAllister's data: for example, in the 1979 survey,
the "powerful statistical methods" were based on just 415 overseas-born
persons. Going on the 1981 Census, that means there should have been
about 21 Yugoslavs , 38 Italians and 7 Lebanese in the sample. Indeed, it
may well be asked if that was sufficient even for the level of disaggregation
they used.
5. Migration as Development Aid
The economist Glenn Withers recently presented an important paper, as
Australia's representative at an OECD conference on migration (Withers
1986). Amongst other things, it contains an up-to-date summary of the work
of the Centre for Economic Policy Research of the ANU, and of similar
approaches in this area. In Section IV of the paper, Withers refers to the
works of Broom et al., McAllister and Kelley and Chiswick and Miller, which
we cover in the present paper, as well as to a large number of other works .
Reading this helps one to understand how a "conventional wisdom" (in
Galbraith's sense) develops: reference is made simply to the conclusions
of the large numbers of studies cited. There is little or no discussion of the
accuracy and appropriateness of the data used in these studies, nor of the
methods of analysis. The conclusions of these studies (which, we would
argue, are often wrong or misleading) thus become "social facts" or "the
state of the art", to be cited by further academics, and to be presented to
policy-makers in even more simplified forms.
For reasons of space, we will not address most of the issues raised by
Wither's paper here, but confine ourselves to one topic: Withers resurrects
the hoary old argument that transferring the labour power of
underdeveloped countries to industrial countries is actually doing the
former a favour:
This can be viewed as an equivalent to foreign aid whereby overseasborn persons are permitted to relocate in Australia rather than Australia
providing them with claims on resources. As such it well exceeds the
international foreign aid goal of one per cent of GDP. (P. 24)
Aren't we Aussies nicel Withers arrives at this conclusion through a "new
measure of present resident economic welfare (PREW)" which he has
developed. This shows that: "Immigrants to Australia have experienced
much higher real income growth by immigrating than they would have
experienced, on a weighted average, in their countries of origin" (p. 24).
The argument that the recruitment of labour for advanced industrial
countries in underdeveloped areas was a form of development aid, was
very popular among employers and labour market authorities in the
sixties. The claim was that the departure of unskilled workers would help to
relieve unemployment, improving incomes and stimulating economic
growth. While abroad the migrants would learn skills which they would be
able and willing to apply upon returning home. In their absence, their
savings and remittances would be used to set up modern industries in key
sectors. (See Castles and Kosack, 1973, pp. 408-420.). Even then, the
reality was different: the workers recruited were mainly young and
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dynamic people, often with the industrial skills and experience needed for
development, rather than the unemployed and underemployed rural
masses. Emigration of labour was becoming a constraint on development,
so that Yugoslavia, Greece and Spain actually started taking counter
measures. By the early seventies, there was a general realisation that
emigration of labour led to structural imbalances, and hindered, rather than
encouraged development. The ILO set up a world employment programme
in 1974 to seek ways of transferring industry and employment
opportunities to the countries from which migrant workers came (see
Castles 1984)2.
The point is that both sides in the debate were conscious that it is
necessary to examine a whole variety of factors: the employment situation
and qualifications of migrants before departure, the effect of migration on
local and national labour markets, effects on productivity, investment,
wages and commodity prices, and the effects of migrants' remittances and
the use of their capital upon return. The problem of Wither's argument on
this issue is not so much that he seems unaware of this whole debate. It is
rather that he can only define migrants' income growth in Australia as a
form of development aid, by making the unspoken assumption that this has
some sort of spin-off for the countries of origin. However he does not
demonstrate this in any way.. So the mere probability that migrants earn
more in Australia than they would have if they had stayed in their countries
of origin, is taken for proof that employing migrants in Australia is
equivalent to development aid. This is the way that "normal science"
creates ideology.
6. Problems of the Paradigm
In looking at various contributions of the "modern sociologists" and the
human capital theorists to the study of the situation of migrants in
Australian society, we have made some specific criticisms. It is now
necessary to get to grips with some of the basic problems of this paradigm.
at "Normal Science".
The use of the term "paradigm" to discuss what people do in the social
sciences is contentious, to put it mildly. Thomas Kuhn, when discussing the
emergence of scientific revolutions specifically, indicated that his concept
of paradigm was peculiarly inappropriate for the social sciences. Be that as
it may, it was not long before the approach Kuhn has taken to physicists
and chemists was turned to focus on sociologists and other social
scientists. Robert Friedrichs adapted Kuhn's approach to a survey of
American and European sociology in 1970, postulating two major schools
of conflicting thought - represented by modes of thought about what social
scientists did. He labelled these first and second order paradigms. "The
fundemental paradigmatic dimension [in a social science hinges on] the
grounding image the social scientist has of himself as a scientific agent"
[Friedrichs 1972, p. 55].
For Kuhn scientific revolutions occurred when "normal science", defined as
the creation of understanding "within the confines of a single paradigm, a
relatively 'classic' study or experiment that has been sufficiently compelling
to shape a discipline's sense of where its problems lie, what its appropriate
tools and methods are, and the kinds of solutions for which it might settle"[
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Friedrichs 1972, p. 4]. Revolutions occur when competing gestalts
redefine crucial problems, introduce new methods and establish uniquely
new standards for solutions. "At the moment of polarisation", writes
Friedrichs, "the devices and procedures that mediate differences in
perspective and evidence in 'normal', non-crisis science fail"[1972, p. 2].
McAllister and Kelley claim that the revolution has occurred, the preparadigmatic nonsense and confusion has been demonstrated as passe,
and that new causal theory is now 'normal' science. Its normality lies in its
effectively undisputed hegemony as the, mode of discourse and dominant
paradigm in social research. Its methods are able to resolve most
contentious social issues and the failure of the previous approaches to do
so has been revealed. Any questions that cannot elicit quantifiable
solutions are seen as irrelevant - or at least unscientific.
So what are the criteria of validity within the "normal scientific" paradigm?
Menzies notes that there are seven main conditions that have to be met if
the method is to achieve what it seeks. The functions should be linear, with
any interactive effects noted and countered. The model should be
recursive, and avoid feedback loops. The causal direction of the variables
can be specified, so that antecedents and outcomes can be identified.
Error terms should be uncorrelated. The assumptions of multivariate
analysis as to the interval scaling, homoscedasticity (error term has
constant variance), and absence of multicollinearity, must hold. The
measuring instruments should be reliable, while dummy variables are
assumed to be point variables [Menzies 1982, p. 157ff]. Is it possible to
restrict the analysis of society to such data? We argue that this leads to a
reduction of social reality, eliminating many central factors.
b) Class Composition
For instance, an important problem arises from the necessity to have
interval data. This leads to the development of hierarchical scales (e.g.
occupational status) which assume that occupational differences represent
hierarchies of agreed value. What does an occupational hierarchy
represent? It is after all an unlinear scale in which an occupation at point
50 has twice the "status" of one at point 25, and half that at 100. Yet when
people are given the opportunity to talk about their responses to different
jobs they give different answers depending on whether they are asked for
their own perception, or what they believe the general public perception is.
Public knowledge about occupations reflects not the actual power
relationships or opportunities associated with them, but the access people
have to information about those jobs. In reality status scales are based on
subjective assessments arrived at through sample surveys, and are merely
a reflection of popular perceptions of social ordering in a given society.
The magic effect of the method is that numbers arrived at in such a
subjective and arbritary way can become the data-base for sophisticated
mathematical procedures, which then convey an appearance of scientific
objectivity to the the coefficients which tumble out of the computer.
The "modern sociologists" argue that status hierarchies remain unchanged
over long periods. However, Wright and Singelmann [1982] have traced
the changes in the content, power and autonomy of various jobs in the
United States labour market over the period 1960 to 1970. They argue that
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occupational locations are fairly poor indicators per se of social class, and
have proposed a reconstruction of both industry and occupational
categories in the Michigan Survey Research Centre and US Census data
they have used. The effect of this detailed reworking is to generate an
emprically based class structure model which when elaborated,
demonstrates some crucial changes in the internal composition of classes
over time.
The destruction of small business and the petty bourgeoisie have been
characteristic of the changes in industrial structures, similar to changes
which have taken place in Australia in the decade 1970 to 1980. The
implication for Australian ethnic minorities of these sorts of changes is that
the petty bourgeois pathway to mobility is closing off. Managerial class
locations expanded greatly in the decade. That is, with the declining
proportion of jobs available in traditional industrial sectors, the vast
majority of new jobs opening up were so-called white collar jobs, which
were traditionally associated with higher status because of their
identification with greater autonomy,power, responsibility and freedom for
the workers involved. However, the evidence from the US indicates that
there was:
a systematic tendency for those positions with relatively little control over
their labour processes to expand during the 1960s, and for those
positions with high levels of autonomy to decline... a continuing process
of proletarianisation does characterise advanced capitalism [Wright and
Singelmann 1982, p. 198].
Thus the meaning of occupational locations may well have changed to
match these recompositions of the classes over time. White collar and
similar jobs with managerial status historically, are becoming in practice
"working" class. The unilinearity and underlying assumptions about what
the hierarchy is supposed to represent does not appear able to cope with
these sorts of factors. The occupational hierarchy may be forced into an
interval form, but the effect of doing this may well be to render results
based on the practice seriously misleading. Consistency of methodology
amongst researchers simply magnifies the nonsense. It does not "prove"
the ladder is socially real.
c) Ethnicity and Gender.
The paradigm refers to the notion of "ethnicity", and as Burnley points out
[1986, p. 66], in fact utilises the surrogate of birthplace to represent
ethnicity. It is then assumed that ethnicity is a point variable (as it has to be,
to be included as a dummy variable in path analysis): you are either ethnic
or not ethnic, a forced choice, which is open to point form specification. It is
clear that for some ethnicities or birthplaces, language skills in English will
be almost collinear: i.e. birthplace and English language skill will be
closely correlated. In others however the relationship will be very different,
and may vary highly. To introduce a dummy variable such as this into a
hypothesis about language and education, and their effect on income, and
discover it has little if any effect, may simply demonstrate the collinearity of
the factors. When such a problem is overlaid by data set problems, both of
sample size and reliability of the Census data drawn from non-English
speaking populations, or populations with limited English language skills,
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the fulfillment of the basic requirements of the paradigm can be shown to
be suspect.
The major findings of Broom et al., [1980] Kelley and McAllister [1984a]
and the other quantitative sociologists is that there is little or no
discrimination in the Australian labour market any more - simply a
response to the endowments of language and education brought by
immigrants. Over time the children of non English speaking immigrants
from southern Europe do rather well in Australia, compared with not only
their parents but also their Anglo-Australian peers. Having consumed this
material one is tempted to agree with Poloma who notes in her review of
causal path analysis techniques, that "any theoretical aspect of path
analysis is a statistical problem rather than a sociological one"[Poloma
1979, p. 136].
Is social mobility for immigrants then not occurring? Clearly, the changes
documented by these researchers have occurred. Are they correct then to
argue that Australia is a liberal democracy with an open opportunity
structure? Our answer is that this approach conceals more than it reveals
of Australian society. Hidden within the findings and disguised by the
approach are two major issues: class relations and gender exploitation.
Regression analysis, used in the papers referred to, decomposes the
actual group characteristics of migrant populations. By holding specific
characteristics constant in the name of comparability (such as age,
education, previous experience), the historical process of recruitment of
migrant labour is made meaningless. The whole point about labour
recruitment is that it does not lead to migrant populations similar in
characteristics to the host population. Typically, it is a movement of young
economically active persons, generally with a male surplus. The economic
and educational characteristics depend on the selection processes of the
receiving country, and these are motivated by the economic and
demographic interests of those in power there. This type of analysis tends
to show that migrants are not discriminated against - their poor socio
economic position is due to the fact thay they have inferior characteristics
(= lack of human capital). Their inferior situation is shown as fair, because
it is a product of structural market forces, rather than of discrimination (for
an exception to the way this method is used see Shergold 1984). But the
uneven development of the world economy, and people's lack of human
capital is itself a result of past inequities and discriminations. However, this
problem simply does not arise for the modern sociology/human capital
paradigm. It is, within the scope of its logical and methodological
assumptions, literally unthinkable.
Immigrant women experience Australian society in ways which are
significantly different to men. Broom et al. [1980] report only the male
experience; the concept of work they use is devoid of awareness of
domestic labour, and necessarily can say little about crucial areas of
women's paid employment, such as outwork. Evans [1984] addresses
herself directly to immigrant women, yet also appears oblivious to the
issues of domestic labour and of outwork. The latter also reveals some of
the more nonsensical elements in the occupational hierarchy approach to
status attainment. In a discussion of female "entrepreneurs", [1984: 1081-
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1082] Evans demonstrates that married Mediterranean women with low
educational backgrounds are more likely to be "entrepreneurs" than
educated unmarried Australian women. This interesting phenomenon is
explained as follows: "high achievers who lack educational credentials
may find their careers stymied in bureaucratically organised firms, and so
strike out on their own". An alternative explanation is that outworkers are
perceived as "self-employed", (higher status than employee!). The 30,000+
women are employed as outworkers in the clothing industry in Australia,
are less likely to be "high achievers" escaping bureaucracy than low paid
women forced to accept machining at home. Disguising exploitation as
freedom may be the result of the methods used, but the ideological effect is
clear.
The conclusion on this reached by Evans, that "Mediterranean women are
the least likely to be in the labour force, have fairly low unemployment
rates, occupy the lowest status positions and receive the lowest wages"
[1984:1084] suggests a compounding of the problem. Many women will
be working in family situations, as unpaid workers creating value, as
outworkers, and as domestic workers. They are unlikely to be formally
seeking work, because they are fully occupied. The labelling of their
experience as "entrepreneurial" is a mockery.
d) The Concept of Society
The "modern sociology" and "human capital" approach reduce the
complexity of human interaction, the role of historically-mediated social
institutions and the significance of values, norms and culture to a set of
mechanistic and quantifiable relationships. To be acceptable, these must
be suitable for "precise and detailed measurement", and for application of
"powerful statistical methods" (Kelley and McAllister, 1983b). In other
words, the object matter of sociology is not to be defined by the
epistemological interest of the researchers (or of social groups or
institutions), but by the method. Anything that cannot be accurately
measured - and that is most of social reality - is to be eliminated from the
discipline. Society as an on-going and complex historical totality is clearly
not measurable, and therefore does not exist for "modern sociology". The
circular logic we noted above in some examples is a product of this
concept of scientific method. Adorno pointed to this dilemma about thirty
years ago (indicating incidentally that this debate is not as modern as
some would have it):
The procedure of operational or instrumental definition generally
current in empirical techniques
sanctions the primacy of the methods
over the object, and ultimately sanctions the arbitariness of the scientific
enterprise itself. The pretence is made to examine an object by means
of an instrument of research, which through its own formulation,
decides what the object is; in other words, we are faced with a simple
circle. (Adorno 1976, p. 73).
Kelley and McAllister actually see the primacy of the method in their
paradigm as an advance: "The central developments in the quantitative
revolution are conceptual and methodological; the descriptive details on
the United States or Britain are peripheral". [1984b, p. 111). The aim of
"modern sociology" is to have good (= normal scientific) methods, not to
understand society. Or as Adorno put it: "The method is likely both to
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fetishise its object and, in turn, to degenerate into a fetish." (Adorno 1976,
p. 72).
Sociology can only be an historical and interpretative science, because
every social interaction, social institution or social norm is a product of
historical developments, within a totality of social relationships. You cannot
adequately grasp the situation of Turkish worker in Australia without a
background understanding of Turkish society, Australian society, the
uneven development of the capitalist world economy, the history of ethnic
relations in Australia, the structure of the Turkish family and a whole galaxy
of further relationships. A Census datum on the income of this Turkish
worker is an isolated social fact, which, taken on its own , is quite
meaningless. Each social phenomenon is only significant in its
relationship to the totality of social relationships. That is why sociological
analysis is always only an approximation to reality. We are forced to
simplify, in order to describe and analyse social relationships. The
justification for that simplification must be sought in the relevance of the
results for social action. The "modern sociologists", in their desire to attain
the status of "normal science" in fact simplify even more than sociologists
who use both qualitative and quantitative methods. They simply reduce
their perception of the real to that which can be quantified. They postulate
that they can understand a given social relationship (income or status for
instance) through perhaps a dozen quantifitative parameters, linked in a
multiple regression model. It looks complex and scientific to the layperson,
because the mathematics give it an aura of scientificity, but such
calculations are in reality a gross oversimplification of a far more complex
process, and may hinder understanding of the way our society works. For
instance, McAllister and Kelley dismiss the possibility of examining power
relations in Australian society with the throw-away remark that "in a
national sample there are too few large capitalists to matter much..."
(McAllister and Kelley 1983c, p. 252) - as if the power of the capitalist class
were a function of its numerical size! This does not mean that there is no
place for statistical methods. On the contrary, both descriptive and
analytical statistics are vital to the social sciences, but we should avoid
inflated claims on their objectivity and predictive power.
el The View of Human Nature
The methodology of "modern sociology" and of "human capital theory"
implies an implicit view of human nature, in which each individual is
perceived as a social atom, trying to maximise his or her economic benefit.
This is based on a concept of rationality, which goes back to the roots of
early bourgeois thought. It is no coincidence that Barry Chiswick starts his
consideration of labour market income by praising Adam Smith's
contribution in The Wealth of Nations, (Chiswick, 1974, p. 11) nor that
Glenn Withers sees the highest accolade for Australia's migration policy in
the assertion that it "can achieve goals of which Mr. Jeremy Bentham
would approve" (Withers 1986, p. 27). The human capital model abstracts
from the complexity of different historical societies and groups, and studies
the behaviour of rational individuals, who make informed choices to raise
their benefits:
The basic framework... is one in which the returns to an individual from
labour market activity are a function of his stock of training - or 'human
capital'.... Since human capital is created at a cost, no one would
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willingly invest in human capital unless it generated sufficient monetary
or nonmonetary benefits to compensate for the cost. The analysis of
investment in human capital is part of the broader analysis of
compensating wage differentials. Human capital can be acquired in
several different ways. Schooling, vocational training, formal on-the-job
training, learning by doing, medical care, acquiring information, and
migration are means by which individuals can increase their
productivity. Hence they create human capital. Unfortunately, we
cannot directly measure units of human capital (i.e. productive powerThis study focuses on the money-income-producing effects of years of
formal schooling and years of labour market experience after
schooling, all of which are quantifiable. (Chiswick 1974, pp. 16-17,
emphasis in original).
Does this concept of the rational economic person have much to do with
the realities that force people to leave their homes and migrate across the
world? Chiswick illustrates his model by looking at seasonal work. He
argues that a person will only take a seasonal job if it offers compensatory
benefits: higher wages for the period worked, plus unemployment benefit
for the period not worked, plus a notional value for the extra leisure time.
This simple model of wages in seasonal industries implies that jobs
offering relatively less employment during the year offer higher weekly
or hourly wages for the time actually worked. The higher wage
compensates for less income during the period of unemployment.
(Chiswick 1974, p. 16).
The model is indeed simple, and has nothing to do with the reality of the
USA, where seasonal work is actually carried out by hundreds of
thousands of migrant workers, mainly undocumented Latin Americans.
Their wages are not higher than average. On the contrary, they are forced
to accept the most appalling wages and conditions, and have no security
of employment nor entitlement to the dole. This particular labour market
does not depend on the rational choices of informed economic subjects,
but on historical power relationships, and on state policies. This may be an
extreme case, but we would argue that the human capital model can in fact
contribute little to an understanding of the mass labour migrations of the
last forty years, nor to an assessment of the situation of the migrants today.
The model simply ignores most of the dimensions relevant for
understanding the causes of migration, and the mechanisms which assign
people to particular sectors of the labour market. Again, it is necessary to
look at the actual structures of sending and receiving societies, at the class
position of migrants before and after migration, and at the processes of
uneven development which cause migration.
4. Conclusion.
Australian sociology has grrown in academic stature and social relevance
in recent years. It may well need to re-run introspective debates which
were worked through in great detail a decade or more ago in Europe and
North America. The significance of these debate today is not purely
academic. The influence of "modern sociology" in policy-making is on the
ascendant, because the quantitative methods appear objective, and
because its conclusions are generally uncritical, and do not question the
existing order. There is no doubt that statistics and quantitative methods
have a central place in the social sciences, but sociology as a discipline
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will not prove its maturity by a feverish striving for scientificity, modelled on
the natural sciences, and based exclusively on numerical procedures. Nor
will it prove its value by adopting a methodology which makes large
portions of its object of investigation invisible. Sociology must look at
society as a whole, and it must be critical towards its object of investigation.
We have demonstrated that these methods and the claim of their
proponents to be doing "normal science" are highly questionable, even on
their own assumptions. In many instances the main product of this
apparently scientific method is ideology. In the debate on positivism, which
occupied German sociology in the 1960s, Adorno drew attention to the
corrosive implications of such approaches:
Such sociology becomes ideology in the strict sense - a necessary
illusion. It is illusion since the diversity of methods does not encompass
the unity of the object and conceals it behind so-called factors into
which the object is broken up for the sake of convenience; it is
necessary since the object, society, fears nothing more than to be
called by name, and therefore it automatically encourages and
tolerates only such knowledge of itself that slides off its back without
any impact. [Adorno 1976, p. 76].
A century and a half ago, the founding father of "social physics", M.
Auguste Comte, warned against the fetishisation of apparently scientific
methods:
The most perfect methods may, however be rendered deceptive by
misuse - and this we must bear in mind. We have seen that
mathematical analysis itself may betray us into substituting signs for
ideas, and that it conceals inanity of conception under an imposing
verbiage. (Comte 1975, p. 250)
The modern sociologists and human capitalists would do well to note that
there is no use in getting scientific answers if the questions are nonsense.

Footnotes
1. This finding could well be explained by a segmented labour market theory of labour
migration, in which policies of recruitment and employment direct migrants towards low
status jobs. Clearly, the migrants with high educational and/or occupational status
before migration will be most obviously disadvantaged.
2. It is curious that the experts of the OECD the ILO and the labour recruiting countries only
discovered that recruiting labour from underdeveloped areas was harmful to
development at the precise moment that Western European economies moved into
recession, so that migrant workers were no longer wanted. Sending them home then
became a new form of "development aid".
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